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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate how fertility decisions respond to unexpected career 
interruptions which occur as a consequence of job displacement. Using an event study 
approach we compare the birth rates of displaced women with those of women unaffected by 
job loss after establishing the pre-displacement comparability of these groups. Our results 
reveal that job displacement reduces average fertility by 5 to 10% in both the short and 
medium term (3 and 6 years) and that these effects are largely explained by the response of 
white collar women. Using an instrumental variable approach we provide evidence that the 
reduction in fertility is not due to the income loss generated by unemployment but arises 
because displaced workers undergo a career interruption. These results are interpreted in 
the light of a model in which the rate of human capital accumulation slows down after the 
birth of a child and all specific human capital is destroyed upon job loss. 
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1 Introduction
A prominent argument in explaining the shortfall of women in top academic
positions in fields like economics is that these careers require a large amount of
front-loaded work effort, which is almost incompatible with the demands of a
family (Ginther and Kahn, 2004). When the tenure and the biological clocks
tick on the same schedule women have to sacrifice either career or family, but
cannot have it all. The situation of women in top positions may, however, only
present the tip of the iceberg. Over the last century women’s role in the labor
market has gradually changed from secondary workers with a limited planning
horizon to equivalent partners or independent decision makers with a life-time
planning perspective (Goldin, 2006). This means careers or jobs that provide
opportunities for promotion and advancement have become more desirable for
women and labor market conditions that impede the establishment of stable
careers early in their lives like unemployment, temporary jobs, or involuntary
turnover, may be reasons for a delay or even a permanent reduction in fertility.
The specific relationship between career and fertility has received little atten-
tion in the formal analysis of fertility decisions. Life-cycle models acknowledge
the interaction of human capital investment and fertility timing and show that
women have an incentive to postpone childbearing if the opportunity cost of
human capital accumulation early in the life-cycle exceeds the value of chil-
dren (Blackburn et al., 1993; Cigno and Ermisch, 1989; Moffitt, 1984). In these
models human capital is typically seen as being entirely transferable and ac-
cumulation occurs at a constant rate so that transitory labor market shocks
do not have a significant impact on fertility. If, however, we distinguish be-
tween accumulation of general and specific human capital it becomes apparent
that certain stages of a woman’s career might be particularly sensitive to an
interruption. In such a model fertility can be affected by short-lived as well as
persistent labor market shocks.
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In this paper we set out to investigate the effect of job displacement on the
probability of having a child in the following period. Job displacement may
have temporary as well as long term consequences on an individual’s economic
circumstances. At a minimum, an exogenous job separation can be seen as
a career interruption, in so far as it forces the individual to start anew with
a different employer. Very often, however, job displacement causes significant
reductions in future wages and earnings, so that its effects are felt in the long-
term.1
In order to distinguish the different channels through which job loss affects
the demand for children we set up a simple dynamic model of fertility which
takes into account that the process of human capital accumulation may be
predominantly firm or career specific. Within this framework we can identify
four key effects of job loss on fertility outcomes. The first two are the income
effect, which results from the inability to smooth consumption over time, and
the opportunity cost effect, which results from the lower value of time during
a period of unemployment. These are the effects traditionally emphasized by
static models of fertility and empirically analyzed by Butz and Ward (1979)
for the U.S. and by Ahn and Mira (2002) across a sample of OECD countries.
The third effect is due to the loss of future income that is incurred if a woman
is unable to invest in human capital at crucial stages of her career.2 This may
be a relevant aspect to consider if we think, for example, that a woman with a
young child is not able to keep up with the intensive training and sorting that
occurs in the first few years on a new job. The final effect operates through
the job finding rate, as pregnant women or women with small children might
be less attractive to potential employers.
We present empirical evidence using data on firm closures identified in the Aus-
1See Ruhm (1991), Jacobson et al. (1993), Stevens (1997) and Ichino et al. (2007) for
empirical evidence on the economic effects of displacement.
2This is consistent with the existing empirical evidence showing that the timing of labor
supply interruptions matters in order to explain future wages (Light and Ureta, 1995).
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trian Social Security Database. The data contains several features which make
it possible to empirically distinguish between the different effects identified in
the theoretical model. First, Austria has a government-sponsored maternity
leave system, which allows mothers to take time off work after giving birth
and provides them with maternity benefits. This system applies equally to all
women in our sample and grants the same amount of benefits independently of
the mother’s employment status or income. Second, the data covers all women
in the labor market. This allows us to compare the displacement effects for
different groups of women, and especially to contrast women in more and less
career oriented occupations. Third, the amount of unemployment experienced
after job displacement varies considerably in our sample. We exploit this varia-
tion to distinguish between the effects of displacement that come from a career
interruption and those that work through unemployment.
In the empirical analysis we compare births to women affected by a firm closure
and to a control group of non-displaced women. Our main analytical tool is
an event study which we use to establish the pre-displacement comparability of
both groups and to display the post-displacement effects. Threats to the causal
interpretation of the displacement effects are differential survival probabilities
across firms and self-selection of workers into different types of firms. The data
provides a wide array of individual and firm characteristics which allow us to
control for these potential selection problems. It turns out that the groups are
remarkably similar before displacement and therefore selection issues do not
play a major role.
Our empirical analysis leads to three main findings. First, our results reveal
that job displacement reduces the number of children born by 5 to 10% in the
short and medium term (after 3 and 6 years, respectively). This suggests that
negative effects of displacement clearly outweigh any opportunity cost effects.
Second, by disaggregating the effects according to individual characteristics we
can show that the reduction in fertility is largely due to the behavior of women
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in white collar occupations and higher earnings groups. This means that those
who suffer lower fertility as a consequence of a firm closure are women who are
more likely to invest in career or firm specific human capital and hence to suffer
from an involuntary separation. Third, we find that unemployment has no extra
effect on fertility on top of the effect due to job loss. To establish this result we
estimate a model that controls for displacement and unemployment separately
and disentangle the two effects using variation in individual unemployment by
industry, region, and year.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the theoretical model
and derive the key effects of displacement on fertility. Section 3 explains the
main features of the institutional setting in Austria. Section 4 describes the data
and the definition of job displacement. We discuss the features of our quasi-
experimental setting and issues of selection in section 5. Section 6 presents
the main results, first showing the direct effects of job displacement on fertility
and then addressing the mechanisms which generate the observed relationships.
We then offer an interpretation of the empirical findings in the light of the
theoretical model. The last section concludes.
2 Theory
It is widely recognized that female labor supply and fertility should be seen
as joint decisions, either because they are determined by the same economic
variables (Mincer, 1963) or because preferences over children and work are
strongly correlated (Tien, 1967). The earliest theoretical contributions date
back to the work of Liebenstein (1957) and Becker (1960, 1965), who extend
the neoclassical theory of consumer demand to model the household’s demand
for children. Their settings are static and assume that the fertility decisions
are taken at one point in time. More realistic models incorporate the long term
nature of the fertility process in a dynamic framework so that features like
4
birth timing, investment in human capital, capital market imperfections, or the
stochastic nature of human reproduction can be incorporated.3
A standard assumption in all life-cycle fertility models to date, however, is
that human capital is entirely general, which means transferable across jobs
and simply accumulated with time spent in the labor market. The birth of a
child affects the human capital accumulation process by either depreciating the
existing stock of human capital or reducing the rate at which human capital
grows in the future. Labor market shocks like a job loss do not have a major
impact on fertility if they are transitory and have small effects on lifetime
income.
In considering the fertility response to job displacement we depart from this
framework and introduce a second type of human capital, which is firm or
career specific. The idea is that specific human capital is destroyed at the
time of job loss and this creates a mechanism such that even transitory labor
market shocks can affect fertility. Our model focuses on a woman’s job search
and fertility decisions after job loss. The job search aspect is relevant to our
problem since one of the objectives of a displaced individual is finding a new
job. Our framework extends the main setup of a dynamic job search model with
endogenous savings (Card et al., 2007; Lentz and Tranaes, 2005) by allowing
fertility to be another choice variable.
Within a discrete time setting we assume that the woman can influence the
probability of birth pt in period t via the choice of contraception. She derives
utility from consumption and the number of children, and disutility from prac-
ticing contraception. It is assumed that the utility function is separable over
time and in all arguments so that per period utility is given by u(ct) + v(kt)−
ψ(pt), where ct and kt are consumption and the number of children, u and v
are monotonically increasing and concave, while ψ is monotonically decreasing
and convex. Income in each period depends on the employment and maternity
3For an excellent survey of the theoretical fertility literature see Hotz et al. (1997)
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status. An unemployed woman receives a UI benefit level b, on a job she earns
a wage w, and after giving birth the woman spends a period on maternity leave
earning maternity benefit m. We assume that m < b < w. Decisions are taken
in three steps. Each period the woman first learns about her employment sta-
tus, then she makes a contraception choice, and after the fertility outcome is
realized, she decides how much of her income to consume or save. We focus here
on a discussion of the main predictions from the model while a full description
can be found in Appendix A.
In order to examine the different channels through which a job loss can af-
fect fertility decisions we first focus on the effects of lower income and reduced
opportunity cost of taking a maternity break resulting from a period of unem-
ployment. In Appendix A we show that the response of the optimal fertility
choice pt∗ to a change in the asset level At is given by
∂p∗t /∂At = {u′(c1t )− u′(c0t )}/ψ′′(p∗t ) ≥ 0, (1)
and thus it is proportional to the difference in marginal utilities from consump-
tion in the maternity leave state c1t and working or unemployment state c
0
t . If
the woman faces borrowing constraints and is unable to fully smooth consump-
tion across maternity states, then u′(c1t ) − u′(c0t ) > 0, which implies that an
additional unit of wealth increases fertility. We call this the income effect.
Further we show that the effect of an increase in w on the optimal fertility
choice is given by
∂p∗t /∂w = −u′(c0t )/ψ′′(p∗t ) ≤ 0, (2)
which is negatively proportional to the marginal utility of consumption, because
a higher wage decreases the marginal return to having a child to the extent that
it raises the value of being employed. This is the substitution effect.
To examine the other channels through which job loss affects fertility timing we
need to specify how wages evolve over time and how a birth affects the mother’s
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employment and income status. We assume that human capital is entirely ac-
cumulated on the job, so that wages grow with job tenure T following a concave
profile w = w(T ). Displacement destroys all job specific human capital and a
woman re-entering a new job starts with wage w(0). We assume further that
the birth of a child has two effects on the labor market situation of the mother:
it lowers her job finding rate, and it reduces the rate at which human capital is
accumulated in the future. These are the two crucial assumptions which allow
us to show that (i) optimal fertility decisions are different for employed and
unemployed women, and that (ii) the birth of a child has a different impact on
future earnings at different stages in a woman’s career because of the concavity
of the wage tenure profile and the reduced human capital accumulation rate
after motherhood.4
The growth of female wages after motherhood has been studied extensively in
the literature and there is evidence that due to reduced working hours, job
effort, or lower probabilities of promotions women face a slowdown in their
wage growth after having children (Miller, 2007), and this may even be more
pronounced for high skilled women (Ellwood et al., 2004). As recent evidence
shows, women who are pregnant or have a small child might face more difficulties
in finding a new job if employers expect young mothers to have higher rates
of absences and a lower job commitment than other women (Cunningham and
Macan, 2007).
The responses of fertility choice to job displacement in our the model are
sketched in Figure 1, which shows wage tenure profiles for various alterna-
tives. In the upper panel we see the profile for a non-displaced woman, whose
earnings evolve according to a concave schedule. If this woman decides to have
a child in period t her earnings drop to the maternity benefit level m during the
period on maternity leave. In the next period she returns to her former job and
4Increased opportunities to control the timing of motherhood (e.g. through the availability
of oral contraceptives) have been shown to play an important role in human capital and labor
supply decisions (Bailey, 2006; Goldin and Katz, 2002).
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earns the same amount she was earning before, i.e. there is no depreciation.
Her future wage profile, however, is characterized by a slower accumulation of
human capital. As we can see, the cost of a child consists of two components:
the earnings loss during maternity leave and the earnings loss due to lower hu-
man capital accumulation in the future. Shifting the birth of the child to later
periods increases the former but reduces the latter, while the concavity of the
wage profile implies that small changes in birth timing have a larger impact at
low than at high tenure levels.
The bottom panel shows the earnings profile for a woman who is displaced
from her job in period t− 1. The job loss may lead to a spell of unemployment
during which she receives UI benefits b. When she enters a new job all her
specific human capital is lost so that she starts again at a wage level w(0) and
in absence of a child her wages evolve according to the original profile. To see
the full effects of job displacement on fertility decision we consider the situation
of a woman, who instead of re-entering employment in period t decides to have
a child. This means her earnings drop to the maternity benefit level m during
maternity leave. Since this woman finds it more difficult to get a new job, she
may experience a further period of unemployment. The combination of the
delay in job entry and the lower wage growth, which is particularly important
while she is still on the steep part of the wage profile, result in a large long
term earnings loss. This comparison makes clear that displaced women face an
incentive to adjust their birth timing decision so that they (1) try to find a new
job before having a child, which is what we call the employability effect, and
(2) delay childbirth until they reach the flatter part of the wage profile, which
is what we call the career effect.
In the remainder of the paper we investigate the empirical relevance of each of
the four effects on fertility decisions after job displacement.
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3 Family Policy in Austria
Austria has an extensive system of family policies and transfers which is rather
generous compared to what available in other European countries (Lalive and
Zweimu¨ller, 2005). The major components of the system, the maternity pro-
tection and parental leave policies, are targeted at parents with young children.
Other forms of support, such as child benefits, extend over the long-term.5 Over
the last 20 years the system has undergone several reforms, most of them with
the aim to increase coverage in the population and to boost fertility.
One of the building blocks of the system is represented by maternity protection,
which is aimed at protecting the health of the mother and the child during the
period around the birth. This period extends over 16 weeks, usually divided
into eight weeks before and eight weeks after the expected date of birth. During
this period mothers are not allowed to work but are insured against dismissal.6
While on maternity protection, women receive a compensation in the form
of sick leave payments which are equivalent to their previous monthly wage.
Unemployed women get an 80% increase of their regular unemployment benefits.
Parental leave sets in after the maternity protection period ends. The system
was introduced in 1957 in order to enable mothers to stay at home with their
young children while still having the opportunity to return to their previous job
(later on this right was extended to fathers). Under the system in operation
in the 1990s the mother or father can choose to go on parental leave until
the child’s second birthday. During this period the parent is protected from
dismissal from her former job and is not allowed to work in any other job.7 If
the parent returns to her former job after parental leave expires she continues
5The interactions of Austrian family policies and active labor market policies are investi-
gated by Lechner and Wiehler (2007).
6Employed women are protected from dismissal when they first announce their pregnancy
to the employer.
7The formal requirement is that while on parental leave the parent must not earn an
amount above the marginal threshold (about 20% of the median gross earnings).
9
to be protected from dismissal for one more month.8
During the parental leave period the parent receives a flat rate benefit of 408
Euros per month (in 1997). Eligibility for the parental leave benefit is closely
linked to eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits. To establish a first-
time claim the mother must have worked for 52 weeks out of the last 2 years.
For mothers younger than 25 the requirement is reduced to 26 weeks during the
last year. Unemployment extends the 2 year time frame by up to 3 years. This
means that a woman who worked for 12 months and then becomes unemployed
has established eligibility for parental leave benefits for up to 4 years if she
continuously stays on the unemployment register. After the first parental leave
period the requirements to re-establish eligibility are lower.
The maximum duration of parental leave was subject to some changes over the
1990s. Before July 1990, parental leave ended with the first birthday of the
child, but afterwards it was extended to the second birthday. As of July 1996
parental leave was reduced, ending 18 month after the birth of the child unless
the second parent took at least 6 months of leave. In this case the parental
leave still ended with the second birthday. From 2002 onwards the system
was reformed completely, coverage was extended to all mothers, not only those
eligible for UI benefits, benefits were increased, the maximum duration was
extended to the third birthday of the child in case the second parent takes at
least 6 months (dismissal protection still only applies up to the second birthday),
and the threshold for income earned while on parental leave was increased.
Child benefits are almost universal in Austria. This means that all parents
with a sufficiently long period of residence in Austria can claim these benefits
irrespective of their income. The period of eligibility extends to a child’s 18th
birthday, and can be as long as a child’s 26th birthday if the child is in full-
time education. The amount received varies with the age of the child, but it
8For parents who are notified of a dismissal after the protected period the regular periods
of notice apply: two weeks for blue collar workers and up to three months for white collar
workers.
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was about 100 Euros per month in the mid 1990s. Take up of child benefits is
extremely high.
4 Data
We analyze the effect of job loss on fertility decisions using data from the Aus-
trian Social Security Database (ASSD) which covers all workers except civil
servants and the self-employed between 1972 and 2002. The dataset includes
daily information on employment and registered unemployment status, total
annual earnings paid by each employer, and various characteristics of the work-
ers and their jobs. The data also contains entries of births, mainly linked to
maternity protection and parental leave spells.
Since eligibility for maternity protection and parental leave is based on previous
employment, a measure of fertility derived from the ASSD might under-report
births to women who do not have a strong attachment to the labor market or
leave the labor force after having a child. For this reason we merge the ASSD
with child benefit records, which contain all births from 1975 to 2005, to derive
a measure of fertility for every woman in the ASSD.9 Our data can therefore
be described as a linked administrative records database.
The sample used in our analysis includes firms that were active, i.e. had at least
one employed worker on the payroll, on any of four specific dates (February 10,
May 10, August 10, and November 10) during the years between 1990 and
1998. Firms can be identified through an employer identifier that is reported
with every employment spell.10 The time at which a firm enters the data is
defined by the first quarter in which we observe the firm identifier. Since we
have the universe of workers and can track firms back to 1972, we can derive a
pretty accurate measure of the age of the firm. Firm closure dates are defined
9See Appendix B for more details on this.
10Note that we use the term firm in a loose sense here, as the data does not allow us to
distinguish between plants or establishments and firms.
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as the last quarter in which a firm has at least one worker on the payroll.
We apply three selection criteria to arrive at the sample of firms considered in
our analysis. First, we exclude firms in which more than 50% of the workforce
move to the same new employer, in order to control for reassignments of firm
identifiers or mergers. Second, we exclude firms operating in the agriculture,
construction, and tourism industries. These firms are characterized by a high
share of seasonal employment and this makes it difficult to identify firm entries
and exits. Third, we consider only firms that have 5 or more employees at
least once during the period 1972-2002, and take only firms with more than 3
employees but less than 200 employees in the last quarter before closure. The
rationale behind this is that it is difficult to identify firm closures for very small
firms and the event is extremely rare among larger firms.11
For the resulting sample of firms we consider all women employed between
quarter 1/1990 and quarter 4/1998.12 We restrict the sample to young women
between 18 and 35 years and with at least one year of tenure in the current
firm. The tenure requirement is important as it ensures that all women are
eligible for parental leave benefits and reduces to some extent the degree of
heterogeneity in our sample.
We then split the sample of women as follows. First, we define as displaced
women all women working in a closing firm the quarter before closure. Second,
we look at all women who work in closing firms one year before closure (i.e.
in the fourth quarter before the closing date). We use this group of women
employed one year before closure to check for changes in the composition of
the workforce of closing firms over the last year. Third, we define as control
all women who are not affected by firm closure, i.e. whose firms do not close
within the next two years.
11In the data there are only 31 firms with more than 200 employees going out of business
between 1990 and 1998 in industries other than tourism and construction.
12Employed means holding either a blue collar or white collar contract. We do not consider
apprentices as being employed.
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The control group is large, as it includes observations on every woman working
in a non-closing firm in any quarter between 1990 and 1998 and hence multiple
observations on most women. To reduce the computational burden, we take a
5% random sub-sample of the women in this group. The final sample therefore
consists of 8,401 observations of women in the displaced group, 9,945 obser-
vations of women in the employed one year before closure group, and 212,738
observations of women in the control group. Note that the distinction between
these groups is based on whether a woman holds a job in a closing or non-closing
firm at a certain quarter. We will refer to this quarter as the reference date.13
By construction, the sample may include multiple observations for the same
individual.14
Firm characteristics
Table 1 compares the characteristics of closing and non-closing firms in the
sample. In total we observe 3,050 closing firms and 41,240 non-closing firms.
Closing firms are smaller, on average about two thirds the size of surviving
firms. They reduce their workforce by 10% in the year before the reference
date, and although they grow over the previous 3 years, they expand less than
surviving firms do. Further, closing firms are characterized by a higher share
of employment turnover, measured by the sum of new hires and layoffs over
total employment, in the final quarter and also in the years before. Earnings
in closing firms are only slightly lower than those in surviving firms. Younger
firms are more likely to close down and we observe a relatively high share of
firm closures in the sales sector and in the last quarter of each year.
Figure 2 shows the development of average firm size in the last five years before
the reference date in more detail. Five years before the reference date both clos-
ing and surviving firms exhibit the same size, about 22 employees on average.
13The condition of a minimum firm size of 4 employees at the reference date applies to all
firms in the sample. Including smaller firms in the sample leads to large variation in some
variables and especially to an over-representation of pregnant women in the closure sample.
This is because, as we saw in section 3, pregnant women are protected from dismissal.
14For about 32% of individuals we have more than one observation in the final sample.
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Afterwards, closing firms show a sharp reduction in average firm size. But this
downward trend in firm size may be misleading. Some of the closing firms (in
general small ones) were not in existence 5 years earlier, so that the trend shown
in the figure is determined to a large extent by the entry of smaller firms into
the sample. All firms in our sample have been in the data for at least one year,
so the development over the last four quarters is not affected by compositional
effects and resembles growth of individual firms. The graph indicates some
downsizing preceding firm closure which may result in a non-random selection
of workers who remain employed until the closure date.
Individual characteristics
Table 2 compares the characteristics of women in the displaced group and in
the control group: see columns (1) and (3). Displaced and control women
are remarkably similar in age, nationality, labor market experience, and the
number of previous children. The differences between women affected by firm
closure and those who are not seem to be mainly related to differences in firm
characteristics. We observe a higher share of workers holding an apprentice-
ship and a lower share of blue collar workers among displaced women, which
probably reflects the industry composition of closing firms. In addition, we find
that displaced women have on average 10% less tenure with their current firm,
reflecting lower firm-age and higher turnover rates of closing firms.
Column 2 in Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of women employed one year
before closure. The samples in columns (1) and (2) overlap only by 45%, because
some women employed in closing firms leave before the closure date and because
we apply the same age and tenure restrictions to all three groups of women.
Also observations in the group of women employed one year before closure are
based on a slightly different firm sample, which includes all firms closing down
after the reference date but does not exclude firms with no women employed
at that point in time and those with less than three employees. Comparing
14
columns (1) and (2) it seems that downsizing has no effect on the composition
of the female workforce in closing firms. The main difference is that women
leaving early are more likely to be blue collar workers.
Our outcome of interest is measured by the number of births per woman after
the reference date. In the full sample we distinguish women who are pregnant at
the reference date, that is who give birth within 6 months of the reference date.
The main analysis will be conducted using a measure of fertility that excludes
births to pregnant women because these fertility decisions have already been
taken before firm closure. Since job displacement might affect the total number
of children as well as the timing of fertility, we consider a short-term and a
medium-term measure of fertility and look at the birth rate 3 and 6 years
following the reference date. As we can see in the bottom rows of Table 2, the
sample means indicate a lower birth rate in the displaced group than in the
control group. In particular, birth rates for the displaced group are 7.9% lower
after 3 years and 9.4% lower after 6 years. This suggests a lasting negative
effect of displacement on fertility.15
5 Firm Closures as a Quasi-Experiment
Our method to analyse the effect of job displacement on fertility consists in
comparing fertility outcomes after the reference date (which is the quarter of
closure for the group of displaced women) for women in the displaced and
control groups. In an experimental setting with random assignment, one could
simply draw a comparison between the average number of births to displaced
and control women in order to estimate the average effect of displacement due
to firm closure on fertility. Firm closures, however, do not happen randomly
and are typically preceded by a period in which the distressed firm downsizes
15As we only observe births up to 6 years after the reference date, we cannot draw any firm
conclusion about completed fertility from our results. However, the 6-year interval should be
long enough to show evidence of catching up effects if these were to occur.
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rapidly. Therefore we potentially face issues of selection at two different levels.
First, we have already seen from Table 1 that closing firms differ from surviving
firms in several ways. Typically, closing firms are smaller and younger than
surviving firms, they have a higher turnover of workers, and they are more
concentrated in the sales sector and in the Vienna region. So, women employed
in closing firms may significantly differ from women employed in surviving firms
if there is non-random selection of workers into firms with different propensity to
close down in the future. Secondly, because of the downsizing and restructuring
that we see in most firms in the last year before firm closure a non-randomly
selected pool of workers may be what is left at the closing date (see Figure 2).
In the literature there is a debate on whether the downsizing process leads
employers to retain the most productive workers, whether it is the workers
with the lowest unobserved ability to stay until the end because they have less
outside options, or whether both effects cancel out each other. Some studies
have tried to model the selection process theoretically and empirically, although
the various possible sources of bias are difficult to disentangle (Lengermann and
Vilhuber, 2002; Pfann and Hamermesh, 2001). Others have taken the view that
workers who leave the closing firm during its downsizing period are all doing so
involuntarily and have included them in the displaced group (Dustmann and
Meghir, 2005; Eliason and Storrie, 2006).
Here we take a different stance, which is also motivated by the specific features
of our empirical setting. We observe that the labor market careers of young
women are rather unstable and characterized by frequent interruptions which
are often due to maternity breaks. This means that if we were to include in
our displaced group women leaving closing firms during the downsizing period
we would see a higher number of births for these women.16 Hence, it seems
16The main assumption rationalizing the inclusion of “early leavers” in the sample of workers
affected by the firm closure is that they all leave the firm involuntarily i.e. because of a layoff
the timing of which they are not able to influence. However, if workers are allowed to choose
the time of departure from the firm the separation should not be considered exogenous, even
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preferable in this case to consider as displaced only those women who were
still employed in the closing firm at quarter 0, i.e. the quarter before the
firm’s disappearance. To gauge the effect of the selection which occurs during
the downsizing period we compare displaced women with all women who were
employed in the closing firms one year before the firm closure (i.e. 4 quarters
before the one preceding closure), which is before the downsizing started. As it
will become clearer below, we are able to demonstrate that these two groups do
not differ significantly in terms of their past labor market and fertility outcomes
and we take this as evidence that the downsizing does not affect the composition
of our group of young women.
To deal with the selection of women into more or less “risky” firms in terms
of their likelihood to close down, we compare past labor market and fertility
outcomes of women in the displaced and control group. We correct remaining
differences between these two groups by a propensity score weighting procedure,
which balances the distribution of observable characteristics in both samples.
The method is described in the next section in more detail.
Our main analytical tool is a graphical analysis based on an event study. This
means that we pool all observations at the reference date and plot the means
of the variables of interest per each quarter before and after the reference date
and separately for the displaced and comparison groups. This provides many
insights into the labor market and fertility dynamics of our sample of young
women, which is characterized by many spells in and out of employment.
The graphical analysis turns out to be particularly useful for two reasons. First,
comparison of outcomes before the reference date establishes the a priori com-
parability of different groups. Second, the comparison of outcomes after the
reference date gives us an idea of the magnitude and the dynamics of the dis-
placement effect. The variables we compare are days employed per quarter, days
unemployed per quarter, earnings, and the number of births. To see how much
if it would have not occurred in the absence of the firm closure.
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sample selection issues affect differences in future outcomes we also apply the
above mentioned propensity score weighting. The magnitude and significance
of the fertility effect are then estimated by means of a linear regression.
5.1 Propensity Score Weighting
Define the treatment variable Ci as equal to one for a firm closure, equal to zero
otherwise, and the potential outcomes for each treatment status by (Y0i, Y1i).
The observed outcome is given by Yi = (1 − Ci) ∗ Y0i + Ci ∗ Y1i. Because
we want to know the effect of job displacement on the probability of having
a child for the average woman in the population, the estimand of interest is
the average treatment effect ATE = E(Y1i − Y0i), where E is the expectation
operator. Motivated by the availability of rich longitudinal information on
both firms and individual labor market careers we make the assumption that
job displacement from firm closure is randomly assigned conditional on a set of
observable variables X, or (Y0i, Y1i)⊥Ci|X. Under this assumption, the average
effect of displacement on fertility is non-parametrically identified (Rosenbaum
and Rubin, 1984).
To estimate the ATE we use a propensity score weighting estimator suggested
by Imbens (2004). The idea of this estimator is to predict the probability that
an individual is displaced conditional on the observable characteristics X, and
then use this probability to construct weights that equalize the distribution of
X in the displaced group and the distribution of X in the control group to the
distribution in the overall population.
More formally, we estimate a parsimonious logit model to predict the probability
pˆi of a firm closure event Ci = 1 for each observation i = 1, . . . , N
pˆi = Pr[Ci = 1|Xi]. (3)
We then weight every observation in the displaced group by 1/pˆi, and every
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observation in the control group by 1/(1−pˆi). Further we normalize the weights
to sum up to 1 in each group. The average treatment effect on the outcome
Yi is then given by the difference between the weighted average outcome in the
displaced group and the weighted average outcome in the control group
ATEweight =
∑N
i=1
CiYi
pˆi∑N
i=1
Ci
pˆi
−
∑N
i=1
(1−Ci)Yi
1−pˆi∑N
i=1
1−Ci
1−pˆi
. (4)
This estimator can be rewritten in terms of the following regression function
Yi = α+ τCi + ui, (5)
which can be estimated by weighted least squares using the weights described
above. In this equation the parameter τ corresponds to the average treatment
effect. We can also add covariates to the regression function and improve the
precision of the estimated parameters
Yi = α+ τCi + Ziβ + ui. (6)
A comparison of the point estimates of τ across specifications (5) and (6) pro-
vides an additional check for the balancing property of the propensity score.
Estimation of the propensity score
Our data provides a large amount of longitudinal information both at the firm
level and at the individual level. We could therefore experiment with different
propensity score specifications. We start by estimating the propensity of firm
closure using firm level information exclusively. The idea is that firm closure is
due to firm-level events and not based on actions at the individual level.
In order to do so, we estimate the probability that a firm with given firm
characteristics will close down one year ahead. We use a one year time difference
to take into account the downsizing and restructuring process which affects the
closing firms in the last period. The independent variables are: industry and
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region dummies, firm age, median monthly wage in each of the last 3 years, firm
size, yearly employment growth, yearly employment turnover, median earnings
growth, share of blue collar workers and of women in the workforce, year and
season dummies, as well as various interactions between these variables.
Second, we estimate a propensity score based purely on individual characteris-
tics. Here we predict the probability that a worker with given characteristics is
affected by a firm closure. The independent variables are: age and age squared,
age at entry in the labor market, whether of Austrian nationality, blue collar
worker dummy, apprenticeship, tenure in the current job, labor market expe-
rience, number of children aged 0-3, 3-6, 6-9, 9-12 in each of the last 4 years,
earnings, percentage of the period employed, percentage of the period unem-
ployed, number of job changes, season and year dummies, as well as various
interactions between these variables.
Finally, we estimate two additional propensity scores based on both worker
and firm characteristics. In one version we use a more parsimonious set of firm
characteristics, including only region and industry dummies, firm age, firm size,
and industry interactions. In the other version we consider the full set of firm
and individual characteristics.
6 Results
6.1 The Effect of Downsizing on the Composition of the Female
Workforce
We start by comparing past labor market outcomes and fertility outcomes of
displaced women and women who worked in closing firms one year before the
closure, i.e. the samples in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2. Figure 3 shows the
development of average quarterly employment, unemployment, and earnings
over the last 5 years before the reference date. Panel (d) shows the yearly
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number of births in the 14 years before the quarter of reference. None of these
graphs shows any systematic difference between the two groups of women in
this period. This confirms what we could see in Table 2.
This is an important indication that the downsizing which occurs in closing
firms during their last year of existence does not affect the composition of the
young female workforce. This does not mean that there are no compositional
shifts in the overall workforce of closing firms during the last period, as shown
by Schwerdt (2006), but simply that compositional issues do not seem to affect
our sample of young women. When looking at the effects of firm closure on
fertility we therefore consider only women directly displaced by firm closure,
i.e. those employed in the closing firm up to the quarter preceding closure.
6.2 Effect of Job Loss on Employment and Earnings
Now we analyze the dynamics of employment and earnings. Figures 4 and 5
show unweighted comparisons between displaced and control groups for em-
ployment and unemployment from 20 quarters before to 12 quarters after the
reference date. Due to the fact that we impose a one-year tenure requirement,
employment and unemployment show a mirror image; up to one year before
the reference date employment rises slowly, then stays at the maximum for one
year before falling again. Displaced workers face a substantial employment loss
in the first quarters after firm closure and cannot fully close the gap even after
3 years.17 Note that pre-displacement employment is slightly lower and unem-
ployment is slightly higher for the displaced group, which indicates that firm
closure does not hit workers completely at random.
Monthly earnings in Figure 6 resemble the pattern of days in employment, which
basically means that earnings for those who are employed do not differ much for
displaced and non-displaced women (see Figure 7). For this group of relatively
17See Ichino et al. (2007) for a comprehensive study of employment and earnings costs for
(older) workers hit by a firm closure in Austria.
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young women we therefore see only minor wage effects after displacement. Put
it differently, expected monthly earnings mainly differ because of the loss of
employment opportunities.
Figures 8, 9, and 10 apply the propensity score weighting approach to bal-
ance observable characteristics across displaced and control women. As one
can see in the upper-left panels (a) in all three figures, controlling for firm
characteristics does not eliminate all the differences. The event of firm closure
is not only related to the type of firm, differences in the composition of the
workforce are also important. Weighting by individual characteristics equalizes
pre-displacement patterns of employment, unemployment and monthly earn-
ings between displaced and control groups. All three versions of the weighting
procedure that use individual characteristics come to the same conclusions. In-
terestingly, our propensity score weighting is very successful in matching labor
market outcomes in each of the past 20 quarters, which corresponds to an equal-
ization of the full labor market career for many of the younger women in the
sample. The patterns of post-displacement outcomes are essentially unchanged
by the weighting scheme. Next we turn to analyze the probability of having a
birth, our outcome measure.
6.3 Effect of Job Loss on Fertility
Figure 11 plots the average yearly numbers of births in the 14 years before
the reference date and up to 10 years thereafter.18 The mean number of births
per year is age adjusted, i.e. it is based on the residuals of a regression of the
number of births on age of the mother and its square. The graph shows that
the average number of births per woman decreases rapidly up to the reference
date, when it becomes zero, and then shoots up dramatically. This pattern is
a consequence of the fact that we select only women with at least one year of
18Note that we only have complete information on births over 6 years after the reference
date. This means that the last 4 points in figure 11 are not based on the full sample.
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tenure at the reference date. This means that all women in our sample must
have been working the year before closure and therefore they have no children
between year -1 and year 0 by construction. As these women are also more likely
to have been in employment two years before the reference date, three years
before the reference date and so on, we observe a decreasing birth rate in the
years preceding closure. The observed jump in the probability of a birth after
the reference date is also a consequence of our tenure requirement. Conditional
on not having had a birth in the last year, these women are very likely to have
a child in the following period. What is important to notice, however, is the
difference in the average number of births between the displaced and control
groups after the reference date. While we observe no significant difference in
fertility behavior prior to the quarter of closure, displaced women clearly and
consistently exhibit lower birth rates from year 2 onwards.
To see how differences in the sample composition affect the birth outcomes we
plot weighted graphs in Figure 13. The different weights neither change the
comparability of the two groups before firm closure nor do they change the
difference in the fertility response. As compared to employment and earnings
dynamics, the differences in fertility between these groups according to firm
and individual characteristics are even less marked.
Figure 12 shows in more detail the quarterly dynamics in the average number
of births after the reference date. We see that the birth rates of displaced
and control women start diverging after the third quarter. Since it takes nine
months from conception to birth, we interpret this as evidence that women do
not have enough information to foresee the exact timing of their job loss.
In the regression analysis we therefore restrict the sample to women who do
not give birth within 6 months of the reference date, i.e. those who were not
pregnant when the firm closed down. As explained in the data section, we
measure fertility outcomes using the number of births in the first 3 and 6 years
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after the reference date to compare short versus medium term birth outcomes.
Results from regressing the birth outcome variables on a firm closure dummy,
equation (5), are shown in Table 3. As with our graphical analysis, we present
unweighted results along with results weighted with our four propensity score
estimates. In the lower panel of Table 3 we show results obtained when we
include standard human capital covariates as additional controls using equation
(5). This can be seen as a further test for the experimental design, which
implies that effects should be invariant to the presence of additional control
variables. To correct the standard errors in the weighted regressions we use a
bootstrapping procedure.
The results are robust and consistent across specifications. The number of
births in the next 3 years after firm closure drops by 0.010 to 0.020. This
corresponds to a drop in fertility of 5 to 10% in the short run. In the medium
run, the magnitude of the drop is in the same ballpark, amounting to 0.021 to
0.040, which is to say a reduction in fertility between 4.9 to 9.3%.19 Although
the point estimates are remarkably similar across specifications we see that
simulated standard errors are larger in the specifications using firm variable
based weights. This confirms our observation that the firm type may be a poor
proxy for the individual risk to lose a job.
If we were to interpret these findings in terms of income vs. substitution ef-
fects, we would think that the income loss due to job displacement largely
dominates any opportunity-cost considerations. However, we saw in section 2
that a negative response of fertility could arise also because of the career effect
or because of job search. Next we investigate if the effect of an unexpected
job loss is the same across different demographic groups. Differential patterns
19To give some idea of the magnitude, we compare these findings with those of Lalive and
Zweimu¨ller (2005). They find that the extension of the maximum duration of parental leave
from the child’s first to the child’s second birthday which took place in Austria in 1990 resulted
in a 4.9% increase in birth rates of second children after three years and a 3.9% increase after
10 years. So the effects we find are at least as large, and in some cases twice the size, as the
effect of a 12 months increase in parental leave.
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across women with different characteristics may help to disentangle competing
theoretical explanations for the drop in fertility. So, in Table 4 we differentiate
between women with and without previous children, compare blue and white
collar workers, two age groups, and three experience and earnings groups. Due
to space constraints we only present results from the unweighted regressions.
All the results point out a consistent pattern. Women without previous children
are those who experience a drop in fertility, whereas women with previous
children remain unaffected. This is possibly a consequence of the fact that
women with previous children have most likely already realized their fertility
plans. Age does not seem to matter much, as we see that both women older
and younger than 25 reduce their fertility. Instead there is a clear difference
according to the occupational position. Women in white collar occupations
and those with higher pre-displacement earnings observe a significant and large
reduction in the probability of having a child, while women in the lowest third
of the earnings distribution and those in blue collar jobs do not show any
change. White-collar jobs offer higher job protection and opportunities for
career advancement, and thus higher expected returns for specific training.
This suggests that women for whom career concerns and the destruction of
firm specific human capital matter most show the largest response to a job loss.
We also find that women with medium experience levels are affected much more
than those with either very little or very much experience. This is also very
interesting, as it hints at a big effect of displacement for women who are at an
important stage of their career.
6.4 Firm Closure Effect versus Unemployment Effect
So far we have looked at the overall effect of an unexpected job loss on the
fertility behavior of young women. This is not to be mistaken with the effect of
unemployment on fertility. On the one hand, a large share of women affected
25
by a firm closure do not experience any unemployment; only 36% of our sample
are unemployed for at least one day in the first year after firm closure (which
is still considerably higher than the 7% of the control group). On the other
hand, as pointed out in the theoretical model, the very fact that a firm closure
occurs might have an impact on fertility over and above its effect through
unemployment. This direct effect is what we call the career effect and is merely
caused by the destruction of specific human capital and the need to start a new
career somewhere else. Making use of the variation in individual unemployment
experience we can try to disentangle the potential effects of a career interruption
from the effects operating through unemployment.
There are, however, serious doubts about whether individual unemployment
can be considered exogenous with respect to fertility. As there might be unob-
servable effects determining unemployment and fertility at the same time, an
instrumentation strategy seems appropriate. In our sample we observe consid-
erable variation in unemployment after firm closure by industry, region, season,
and calender year. Since there is no reason to assume that the direct impact
of starting a new job on fertility would be different along these dimensions we
use firm closure interacted with industry, region, season and year dummies as
instruments for unemployment. We estimate the following model
Yi = α+ τCi + γUi + Ziβ + vi (7)
where Ci is an indicator for firm closure and Ui is a measure of unemployment.
In our analysis we use three different variables to measure unemployment: the
percentage of time the individual is unemployed during the first year after the
reference date,20 an indicator variable equal to one if there is positive unem-
ployment in the first year after the reference date, and an indicator variable
equal to one if employment is less than 75% in the first year after the reference
20For displaced women the unemployment rate in the first year is 13%, compared to 2%
for the controls; among those experiencing at least one day of unemployment the rate is 35%
(23% for controls).
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date.21
Table 5 shows the results from the IV estimations, with models 1 to 3 repre-
senting the three different measures of unemployment.22 A remarkable pattern
emerges; whatever measure we use, unemployment never has a negative effect
on fertility. On the contrary, in the upper panel all the point estimates are even
positive although not significantly different from zero. On the other hand, the
direct impact of firm closure on fertility is negative in all cases and compara-
ble in size to the effects in Table 3, although here the effects are less precisely
estimated.
In the lower panel, we concentrate on white collar workers, because we are
concerned that the differential unemployment experience across occupational
groups might be what is driving our results. Remember, that we find the
biggest fertility effects for white collar workers. If they experience on average
lower unemployment than blue collar workers this might explain the lack of an
unemployment effect. But the effects for white collar workers are amplified: the
indirect effect of firm closure via unemployment is zero or even positive, while
the direct effect of firm closure is larger, negative, and significant at least in the
6-year horizon.
This confirms that for women in white collar jobs, a firm closure has a detri-
mental career effect. Regardless of whether they become unemployed or not,
women hit by a firm closure have to postpone their fertility plans in order
not to jeopardize their transition into a new firm. This effect extends to a
medium-term perspective, within 6 years after firm closure fertility is reduced
by approximately 0.4%. Given that we cannot observe completed fertility pe-
21We use different measures of unemployment to capture different aspects of the phenom-
enon. Registered unemployment may not coincide with the time out of a job, so we also
look at employment and consider individuals employed less than 75% of the year. 30% of the
displaced women are employed less than 75% in the first year compared to 9% of the controls.
22For these IV estimates we have to use unweighed regressions because there is no clear
correspondence between our chosen indicators of unemployment and the composition of the
firm closure vs. non-firm closure sample. Our specification in Table 5 therefore has to be
compared with the first result in the lower panel of Table 3, which is very close to the average
effect across all specifications.
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riods we cannot conclude if fertility is only postponed or permanently lowered.
Often though temporary postponement may lead to a permanent reduction in
fertility not least because for biological reasons the probability of conception
decreases with age.
6.5 Theoretical Interpretation of the Empirical Findings
The empirical analysis of employment and wage development after job loss
shows that displacement mainly affects income through lower employment,
while re-employment wages are hardly affected by the job loss. The employ-
ment effects are largest in the first year after job loss and rapidly decrease in
subsequent years. We conclude therefore that for young women job displace-
ment is a transitory shock; relative to their lifetime income displacement effects
are likely to be small. Nevertheless we see substantial reductions in fertility
which appear to be stable at least over a horizon of 6 years. Which are the
mechanisms within the theoretical context that are responsible for this effect?
Our theoretical model identifies four main effects by which a job loss might affect
fertility decisions. The substitution effect predicts that births are transferred
to periods with lower opportunity costs, which would mean an anticipation of
births after job loss. All other effects predict delays in fertility or lower fertil-
ity rates. The income effect accounts for the inability to smooth consumption
during periods with lower income. The employability effect is due to the diffi-
culties young mothers might face in finding a new job. The career effect results
from long term income losses a mother might face if she is unable to invest into
human capital at a crucial stage of her career. How can we make use of the
empirical evidence to distinguish between the different mechanisms and single
out the most important ones?
Looking at the pattern of fertility reductions over time and comparing results
across subgroups, it becomes clear that we do not find any evidence of a sub-
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stitution effect. The negative effects of job displacement seem to outweigh any
incentives to anticipate fertility. In particular, the penalty of a lower job finding
rate for young mothers might be higher than the opportunity cost effect dur-
ing unemployment, which would imply that the employability effect directly
counteracts the substitution effect.
To distinguish between the income effect and other effects predicting a delay
in fertility, we note that the only channel through which an income effect can
influence fertility decisions is unemployment. However, when we compare the
impact of unemployment on fertility with the direct effect of job loss using the
instrumental variables strategy we find no evidence of a negative impact of
unemployment on fertility. What we do find is a direct effect of unexpected job
loss on fertility, which is present irrespective of whether the woman experiences
a spell of unemployment or not. This leads us to rule out explanations in terms
of the income effect.
The empirical analysis of the fertility effects by subgroup provides strong ev-
idence of a career effect. Especially, we find that only women in white collar
occupations reduce their fertility, but woman in blue collar jobs do not. Blue-
collar jobs provide a low level of employment protection and limited opportuni-
ties for career advancement. Women in white collar occupations, on the other
hand, face stronger incentives to invest in career specific human capital and are
thus more likely to suffer from a job loss.
Our empirical set up does not allow us to distinguish clearly between career
and employability effects. If we assumed that the reduction in job finding rates
due to fertility is the same across all groups of mothers, we would think that
there is no employability effect as we find no fertility reduction among blue collar
women. However, if women in career-oriented occupations face more difficulties
in finding a suitable job in the presence of a young child our results could be
interpreted as a combination of the employability and career effects. As we have
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seen in the example in figure 1 displaced women in career-oriented occupations
might face large income losses from the interaction of both effects. These women
react by returning to a new job without a delay from a maternity, and thereafter
fully invest in career specific training before having children. Hence, both effects
work in the same direction and contribute to reduce fertility among white collar
women after job displacement.
7 Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to explore how women’s fertility decisions are affected
by career considerations. The literature has been aware of the incompatibility of
career and family demands for women in top positions (Armenti, 2004; Cooney
and Uhlenberg, 1989; Ginther and Kahn, 2006), but there is a lack of formal
discussion about how much career choices drive the fertility behavior of women
in the overall population.
We investigate fertility responses to an unexpected career interruption in the
form of a job loss after firm closure. We lay out a theoretical model which
allows us to distinguish between different channels through which job loss can
affect fertility decisions. A key feature of the model is that we consider the
accumulation of firm or career specific human capital, which is destroyed as a
consequence of the firm closure and needs to be re-built on a new job. Our
empirical results show that the main factor responsible for a reduction of fer-
tility upon job loss is the difficulty women face in pursuing their careers. The
experience of unemployment itself is not able to account for this. This effect is
not confined to women in top positions, but we find a considerable reduction
in fertility for the average white collar worker over a period of six years. On
the other hand, fertility decisions of blue collar workers, who face little oppor-
tunities for career advancement in their jobs, do not seem to respond to a job
loss.
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Our results highlight that the increasing importance of professional careers for
female workers might go a long way in explaining recent fertility trends. In this
context, even temporary labor market shocks, which hit young women at crucial
stages of their careers may significantly contribute to delays or reductions in fer-
tility. Our research stresses the importance of career progression and continuity
and deemphasizes the role of unemployment, which has assumed particular rel-
evance in explaining fertility trends in some European countries (Adsera, 2005;
Ahn and Mira, 2002). Examples of constraints which impede the development
of careers would be the high prevalence of fixed-term contracts which delay the
entry into permanent positions and thus the establishment of stable careers for
young workers (de la Rica, 2005). Our results also imply that family policies like
the Austrian and German one, which rely mainly on income support for young
parents should be complemented by measures aimed at protecting young moth-
ers’ career prospects and labor market attachment like the provision of child
care facilities, full-time schools, and more flexible working-time arrangements.
Appendix A
Model setup
Consider a discrete-time setting where individuals have a finite planning horizon
and a subjective discount rate ρ. Let r denote the fixed interest rate in the
economy. We assume that a woman can influence the probability of birth pt
via the choice of contraception. She derives utility from consumption and the
number of children, and disutility from practicing contraception. It is assumed
that the utility function is separable over time and in all its arguments. Per
period utility is given by u(ct)+v(kt)−ψ(pt), where ct and kt are consumption
and the number of children, u and v are monotonically increasing and concave,
while ψ is monotonically decreasing and convex. All functions are assumed to
be twice differentiable.
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At the beginning of period t the state variables are assets At, employment
status et−1 in period t-1 (et−1 = 1 if the woman was employed last period
and 0 otherwise), kt−1 number of children by the end of period t − 1, and
Tt the accumulated job tenure. We assume that the woman enters period 1
after job displacement, when she is unemployed and tenure is reset to zero.
For simplicity we also assume she is childless at the beginning of period 1, i.e.
e0 = 0, k0 = 0, T1 = 0. If the woman is unemployed she receives unemployment
benefits b and finds a job at a rate which is exogenously given. Once found,
a job is expected to last indefinitely. Wages on the job are paid according
to a deterministic scheme and rise with tenure T . Specifically, w′(T ) > 0,
w′′(T ) < 0, and w(0) > b.
If a woman is employed at the beginning of period t she chooses pt and with
probability pt she immediately has a child. After giving birth the woman spends
the current period t entirely on maternity leave and earns maternity benefits m
with m < b < w(0). During maternity leave she does not accumulate tenure,
but she enters the next period t + 1 in employment and with T = Tt−1. With
probability 1− pt the woman does not have a child in period t and earns wage
w(Tt). During employment she also accumulates tenure. A woman with no
child accumulates one period of tenure per period worked, while a woman with
a child accumulates tenure at a rate γ < 1 each period worked. Tenure grows
over time according to the expression Tt+1 = Tt+et(1−I(kt > 0))+γetI(kt > 0),
where I(kt > 0) denotes the indicator function which is equal to 1 if a child is
present and zero otherwise.
If the woman enters period t unemployed, she is assumed to find a job at the
exogenous rate s if childless and at a lower rate sδ (δ < 1) if already has a child.
If the woman finds a job, she immediately enters employment at the beginning
of the period and her choices are the same as those of the employed woman.
If she remains unemployed, she chooses pt and if she has a child she goes on
maternity leave and gets maternity benefits m in period t, but she enters period
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t+ 1 still unemployed and with a lower probability of finding a new job.
Optimal Fertility Choice
We focus on decisions about the first birth, because this turns out to be the
relevant decision for the women in our empirical setup. See sections 3 and 4
for a more detailed discussion of this point. In each period decisions are taken
at three stages. First, the labor market situation of the woman is observed. She
is either employed or unemployed, and if unemployed the outcome of her job
search effort is realized. Second, the fertility outcome is chosen conditional on
her labor market status. Finally, optimal consumption and savings are decided
upon and utility is maximized. We express each of these decision nodes in terms
of Bellman equations.
Let us start from the situation of a woman who in period t is unemployed and
looking for a job. Her value function at the stage of job search Us is given by
Us(0, kt−1, At) = s(kt−1)V (0, kt−1, At) + (1− s(kt−1))U(0, kt−1, At), (8)
with s(kt) = s(1− I(kt > 0)) + sδI(kt > 0).
Now consider what happens when labor market status is known and the woman
takes her fertility decision. The value functions for employed and unemployed
women, V and U respectively, are given by
V (Tt, kt−1, At) = max
pt
ptVc(Tt, kt−1 + 1, At) +
(1− pt)Vc(Tt, kt−1, At)− ψ(pt), (9)
U(0, kt−1, At) = max
pt
ptUc(0, kt−1 + 1, At) +
(1− pt)Uc(0, kt−1, At)− ψ(pt). (10)
After the realization of the job search and fertility outcomes all women know
et, kt, their income It ∈ {w, b,m} and Tt+1, and choose consumption ct and
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savings for period t.23 At this stage the value functions for employed women
with children and without children, V 1c and V
0
c respectively, are
V 1c (Tt, kt, At) = max
At+1
u(m+At − At+11 + r ) +
v(kt) +
V (Tt+1, kt, At+1)
1 + ρ
, (11)
V 0c (Tt, kt, At) = max
At+1
u(w(Tt) +At − At+11 + r ) +
v(kt) +
V (Tt+1, kt, At+1)
1 + ρ
. (12)
The value functions for unemployed women U1c and U
0
c are determined analo-
gously.
¿From equations (9) and (10) we derive the first order conditions for optimal
fertility choice in the employed and unemployed states
ψ′(p∗t ) = V
1
c − V 0c , (13)
ψ′(p∗t ) = U
1
c − U0c . (14)
These equations express the fact that the woman chooses pt to equate the mar-
ginal cost and the marginal benefit of fertility, which is given by the difference
between the optimized values of having an additional child or not.
Model Predictions
Our predictions about optimal fertility choices follow from the comparative
statics derived from (13) and (14). This way we explore the different channels
through which a job loss can affect fertility decisions. The first effects of job
loss are to lower income and to lower the opportunity cost of taking a maternity
break because of a period of unemployment. To consider the consequences of
these effects, we examine the change in p∗t due to a change in the asset level
23Other family income, like husband’s income is assumed to be exogenous and does not
enter our model in order to simplify the discussion.
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and a change in the wage rate. To simplify notation let c1t,e denote optimal
consumption of an employed woman who is on maternity leave in period t, and
c0t,e the consumption of a woman who is working.
Differentiating equation (13) with respect to At and applying the envelope
theorem, we obtain
∂p∗te/∂At = {u′(c1t,e)− u′(c0t,e)}/ψ′′(p∗te) ≥ 0, (15)
∂p∗tu/∂At = {u′(c1t,u)− u′(c0t,u)}/ψ′′(p∗tu) ≥ 0. (16)
where p∗te and p∗tu are the optimal values for the employed and unemployed
woman, respectively. The effect of additional wealth on fertility depends on
the difference in marginal utilities between the maternity leave and working
states. If women can smooth consumption perfectly, they set u′(c1t,e) = u′(c0t,e),
and the effect on fertility is zero. If women face borrowing constraints, then
u′(c1t,e)− u′(c0t,e) > 0, which implies that an additional unit of wealth increases
fertility. We call this the income effect.
Next consider an increase in period t wage
∂p∗te/∂w = −u′(c0t,e)/ψ′′(p∗te) ≤ 0 (17)
The effect of an increase in w is negatively proportional to u′(c0t,e), because a
higher wage decreases the marginal return to having a child to the extent that
it raises the value of being employed. This is the substitution effect.
Apart from unemployment, a job loss can have significant effects on a woman’s
career because it destroys her firm or career specific human capital. This chan-
nel can be captured by investigating the effect of job tenure on the fertility
choice. To simplify matters, assume that a woman’s lifetime can be separated
into periods in which she is fertile (0 ≤ t ≤ R) and periods in which she is too
old to have children (R + 1 ≤ t ≤ tmax). A woman employed in the last fertile
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period R remains employed for the rest of her life and faces a deterministic
income stream.
Suppose that in period R the woman is still childless.24 In this case the effect
of an increase in tenure on fertility is given by
∂p∗Re/∂T = −u′(c0R,e)w′(T )/ψ′′(p∗Re) + (18)
1
ψ′′(p∗Re)
tmax−R∑
t=1
1
(1 + ρ)t
u′(c1t,e)w
′(T + γ(t− 1))−
1
ψ′′(p∗Re)
tmax−R∑
t=1
1
(1 + ρ)t
u′(c0t,e)w
′(T + t)
The first term in this equation is negative and reflects the higher income loss
during maternity leave for women with higher tenure. The difference between
the second and third terms, however, is positive because it reflects the differ-
ences in marginal utility from a reduced income stream following childbirth
which is due to the slowdown in tenure accumulation. Given that the time
employed after the fertile life span is long enough, the discount rate is not too
large, or the “maternity penalty” in terms of future tenure accumulation is sub-
stantial, the positive long term effect could easily outweigh the negative income
loss from maternity leave, and ∂p∗Re/∂T > 0. By solving the model backwards
we can generalize the same argument to earlier periods and show that fertility
is delayed to periods with higher job tenure. This is what we call the career
effect.
Finally, consider the difference in fertility decisions between unemployed and
employed women. Using an argument similar to the one above we start by
looking at employed versus unemployed women who are still childless at the
beginning of their last fertile period. From equations (13) and (14) we know
that differences in their optimal fertility choices are reflected in the gap between
24Note that the fact that a woman is still childless in period R may simply be a consequence
of a series of unlucky realizations of pt. Also, we focus here on decisions about the first birth,
as discussed above.
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the value functions for having a child and for not having a child; V 1c − V 0c and
U1c − U0c , respectively.
In period R the immediate income loss from having a child is lower for un-
employed women, because u − m < w(T ) − m. In subsequent periods, how-
ever, the gap in income for unemployed women is determined by the lower
job finding probability following the birth and the lower tenure accumulation
once they find employment. Women employed in period R only suffer income
losses in subsequent periods from the lower tenure accumulation. Therefore if
the long term effect outweighs the income loss in the first period we will have
U1c − U0c > V 1c − V 0c and hence p∗tu ≤ p∗te. If we transfer this result to earlier
periods this implies that women will try to delay childbirth until they have
found a new job. We call this the employability effect.25
Appendix B
Birth records
The Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD) contains entries of births, spells
of maternity protection, and parental leave for the period between 1972 and
2002. As discussed in section 3, maternity protection and parental leave is
only available to women who worked a certain number of weeks prior to giving
birth. Although the ASSD contains actual birth dates, which could potentially
be unrelated to the mother’s working history, close inspection of the data re-
veals that the vast majority of births recorded in the data are connected to a
maternity protection and/or parental leave spell. This may raise concerns that
any measure of fertility directly derived from the ASSD could under-report the
number of births in the population.
25Note that in this model the job finding rate and the reduction in the job finding rate after
childbirth are exogenous, i.e. they do not depend on individual decisions about search effort.
An extension of the model allowing for endogenous search effort and with search costs rising
in both search effort and the number of children would lead to a similar prediction.
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As a first check on the data we show in Figure 14 the yearly number of births
from the Austrian vital statistics and the same number as derived from the
ASSD records. The two lines track each other nicely over time. We see them
getting closer as female labor force participation rises. However, differences
remain and even in the last decade we notice about 18% less births recorded
in the ASSD. An obvious reason for the difference in recorded births is the
coverage of the ASSD, where self employed, housewives, and civil servants are
not included. However, it is still possible that part of the difference between the
ASSD births and those recorded in the vital statistics data is due to the fact
that the ASSD under-reports births to women who have a more fragmented
labor force history which implies extended gaps in their ASSD records.
Because of these concerns, we access information on births from a different
data source. From 1993 onwards the Austrian finance ministry keeps electronic
records of child benefits paid to either the mother or father of all children below
the age of 18. These records contain the birth dates of children, and in most
cases both parents’ social security numbers. Since take-up of child benefits is
almost universal, we should observe birth dates of all children born in Austria
form 1975 onwards in these records.
Using the social security number of the mother we match the mothers in the
ASSD data to those in the child benefits records. Figure 15 shows the number
of births in both data sources for all women in the sample selected for analysis.
The gap between the two data sources is particularly big in the period before
1990. This is most likely due to births not recorded in the ASSD because the
mothers in our sample had not yet entered the labor market. Between 1990
and 1998 the gap is quite narrow, as our sample of women is selected on the
basis of participation to the labor market, and opens-up in later years, when a
high percentage of women in our sample drops out of the labor force.
We then compare the births to each mother in the ASSD records with the births
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collected via the child benefits records to cross-verify the information we obtain
from these sources. We find that we can match about 98% of the birth records
in the ASSD using the child benefit data.26 This implies that the child benefit
data provide a good coverage for our sample of women. At the same time we
find 13% additional births in the child benefits data. This seems to justify our
concern that the ASSD birth records could under-report the number of births.
Our final measure of fertility is therefore derived by combining the ASSD and
child benefits records. This gives us not only a very good measure of fertility,
which is independent of the mother’s labor force status and history, but also
allows us to derive the full fertility history of the women in our sample since
the child records go back to 1975.
26Missing matches occur for children born in the early 1970’s who are not likely to be eligible
for benefits any more, or from cases where the father claims child benefits and does not give
information on the mother so that we cannot find a match the mother’s social security number.
From 1990 onwards there are less than 1% of births in the ASSD which do not have a match
in the child benefit records.
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Figure 1: Fertility and job displacement
Notes: Panel (a) represents the wage-tenure profile of non-displaced women. It dis-
tinguishes between women without a child and women who have a child at time t
and are on maternal leave between t and t+ 1. Panel (b) represents the wage-tenure
profile of women displaced at time t-1, who are unemployed between t-1 and t. It
distinguishes between women without a child and women who have a child at time
t. The latter are shown to be on maternal leave between t and t+1 and to suffer a
second unemployment spell between t+1 and t+2.
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Figure 2: Average firm size in closing and surviving firms
16
18
20
22
24
Av
e
ra
ge
 
n
u
m
be
r 
o
f e
m
pl
o
ye
e
s
-20 -16 -12 -8 -4 0Quarters before reference date
Closing firms Surviving firms
Notes: Average number of employees in closing firms and surviving
firms by quarter.
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Figure 4: Average days employed by quarter
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Notes: Comparison between the average number of days employed of
displaced and control women by quarter.
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Figure 5: Average days unemployed by quarter
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Notes: Comparison between the average number of days unemployed
of displaced and control women by quarter.
Figure 6: Average earnings by quarter
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trol women by quarter.
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Figure 7: Average earnings conditional on employment by quarter
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Notes: Comparison between the average earnings (conditional on em-
ployment) of displaced and control women by quarter.
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Figure 8: Average days in employment by quarter weighted by propensity scores
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Figure 9: Average days in unemployment by quarter weighted by propensity
scores
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Notes: Comparison between the average number of days in unemployment of displaced (blue)
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Figure 10: Average earnings by quarter weighted by propensity scores
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Figure 11: Average number of births by year
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Notes: Comparison between the average number of births of displaced
and control women by year after the reference date. Number of births
is age adjusted.
Figure 12: Average number of births by quarter
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and control women by quarter after the reference date. Number of
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Figure 14: Number of births per year
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Notes: Annual number of births in the ASSD data and in the population. Source:
ASSD and Statistics Austria.
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Figure 15: Number of births per year in the ASSD and Ministry of Finance
child benefit records
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Notes: Annual number of births in the sample selected for estimation in the ASSD
and child benefit records. Source: ASSD and Austrian Ministry of Finance.
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Table 1: Firm Characteristics
Closing Firms Surviving Firms
Mean Median Std.Dev. Mean Median Std.Dev.
Employees quarter 0 15 7 24 23 10 33
Employees quarter -4 19 9 27 22 10 32
Female employees quarter 0 7 4 12 10 5 15
Female employees quarter -4 8 4 14 9 5 14
Employment growth year -1 -0.10 -0.1 0.34 0.05 0 0.22
Employment growth year -4 to -2 0.06 0.00 0.37 0.14 0.00 0.33
Turnover quarter 0 0.42 0.18 1.13 0.15 0.10 0.20
Turnover year -2 0.95 0.76 1.43 0.69 0.56 0.65
Turnover year -3 0.89 0.71 0.87 0.71 0.57 0.83
Median earnings quarter 0 18,143 16,720 7,330 18,152 17,156 6,559
Median earnings quarter -4 17,252 15,878 6,866 17,476 16,506 6,411
Firm age 11.52 10 8.19 13.53 15 7.91
Censored firm age 0.26 0 0.44 0.35 0 0.48
Manufacturing 0.26 0 0.44 0.23 0 0.42
Sales 0.41 0 0.49 0.34 0 0.47
Transport 0.05 0 0.22 0.04 0 0.20
Services 0.28 0 0.45 0.39 0 0.49
Vienna 0.28 0 0.45 0.23 0 0.42
Lower Austria 0.18 0 0.39 0.18 0 0.38
Upper Austria 0.17 0 0.37 0.17 0 0.38
South 0.18 0 0.39 0.20 0 0.40
Salzburg 0.07 0 0.26 0.08 0 0.27
West 0.12 0 0.32 0.14 0 0.35
Year
1990 0.08 0.28 0.11 0.31
1991 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31
1992 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.31
1993 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.30
1994 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.31
1995 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.31
1996 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.31
1997 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33
1998 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.34
Quarter
10-Feb 0.19 0.39 0.24 0.42
10-May 0.21 0.40 0.25 0.43
10-Aug 0.21 0.41 0.26 0.44
10-Nov 0.39 0.49 0.26 0.44
Observations 3,050 41,240
Notes: Sample of firms with at least one female employee aged between 18 and 35 with one year of tenure.
For closing firms quarter 0 refers to the closing date, for surviving firms it represents the reference date.
Quarter -4 refers to the quarter one year before the reference date. Year -1 is the last year before the
reference date, year -2 the second but last year, and so on. Turnover rates are defined by the number of
hires plus number of separations within the given year divided by number of employees at the end of the
year. Median earnings refer to the median earnings in Euro (prices 2000).
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Table 2: Individual Characteristics
Displaced Employed one year Control Displaced-Control
before closure % difference
Age 27.23 27.01 27.10 0.46%
(4.67) (4.68) (4.71)
Austrian 0.94 0.95 0.96 -2.02%
(0.24) (0.22) (0.21)
Age at labor market entry 17.02 16.90 16.91 0.66%
(3.03) (2.84) (2.72)
Apprenticeship 0.40 0.40 0.37 9.44%
(0.49) (0.49) (0.48)
Blue collar 0.24 0.27 0.26 -8.97%
(0.42) (0.44) (0.44)
Number of children 0.46 0.44 0.44 5.21%
(0.76) (0.75) (0.75)
Experience (months) 104 105 104 0.37%
(53.40) (53.36) (52.68)
Tenure (months) 43 44 48 -11.98%
(34.40) (34.75) (36.81)
Earnings 17,547 17,902 18,070 -2.89%
(7,765) (7,027) (7,373)
Pregnant 0.029 0.028 0.026 9.88%
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16)
Births next 3 years 0.21 0.22 0.23 -5.57%
(0.47) (0.46) (0.47)
Births next 6 years 0.42 0.44 0.46 -7.97%
(0.69) (0.69) (0.70)
Observations 8,651 10,229 218,548
Non-pregnant women
Births next 3 years 0.18 0.18 0.20 -7.92%
(0.43) (0.42) (0.44)
Births next 6 years 0.39 0.40 0.43 -9.35%
(0.66) (0.66) (0.68)
Observations 8,401 9,945 212,738
Notes: Variable means, standard deviations in parentheses. Displaced group includes women aged 18
to 35 with at least one year of tenure in closing firms at the closure date. Employed one year before
closure group includes women aged 18 to 35 with at least one year of tenure and employed in the
closing firms one year before the closure date. Control group is a 5% random subsample of women
aged 18 to 35 with at least one year of tenure in firms that do not close within the next 2 years of the
reference date. The outcome variables are given by the number of children born after 3 (or 6) years of
the reference date. When considering non-pregnant women the outcome variable includes the number
of children born between 6 months and 3 (or 6) years of the the reference date.
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Table 3: Effect of firm closure on fertility
Births Births
next 3 years next 6 years
With no covariates
Unweighted -0.016** -0.040**
(0.005) (0.008)
Weighted: firm char. -0.010 -0.022
(0.007) (0.012)
Weighted: individual char. -0.014** -0.036**
(0.005) (0.008)
Weighted: individual and some firm char. -0.010 -0.021*
(0.007) (0.010)
Weighted: individual and all firm char. -0.010 -0.022
(0.010) (0.013)
With covariates
Unweighted -0.011* -0.027**
(0.005) (0.007)
Weighted: firm char. -0.011 -0.023*
(0.007) (0.012)
Weighted: individual char. -0.014** -0.034**
(0.005) (0.008)
Weighted: individual and some firm char. -0.011 -0.024*
(0.006) (0.010)
Weighted: individual and all firm char. -0.013 -0.027*
(0.008) (0.012)
Observations 221,139 221,139
Notes: Displaced group includes women aged 18 to 35 with at least one year of tenure
in closing firms at the closure date. Control group is a 5% random subsample of women
aged 18 to 35 with at least one year of tenure in firms that do not close within the next
2 years of the reference date. The outcome variable births next 3 years measures the
number of children born between 6 and 36 months after the reference date. Covariates
include: number of children born in the last 3, 6, and 9 years, age and its square, tenure,
experience, indicator for apprenticeship, blue collar status, earnings at the reference date,
year and quarter dummies. For weighted regressions standard errors are bootstrapped
(500 replications). Symbols: ** significant at 1%;* significant at 5%.
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Table 4: Heterogeneous effects of firm closure on fertility
With no covariates With covariates
Births Births Births Births
next 3 years next 6 years next 3 years next 6 years
No previous children -0.022** -0.053** -0.018** -0.044**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009)
Previous children 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.005
(0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013)
Bluecollar 0.012 -0.001 0.012 -0.001
(0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.015)
Whitecollar -0.024** -0.052** -0.018** -0.036**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008)
Age<25 -0.010 -0.039** -0.009 -0.033*
(0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013)
Age>=25 -0.016* -0.033** -0.013* -0.025**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009)
Experience 1st tertile -0.013 -0.034* -0.010 -0.020
(0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013)
Experience 2nd tertile -0.025** -0.057** -0.023** -0.051**
(0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013)
Experience 3rd tertile 0.001 -0.010 0.001 -0.011
(0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013)
Wage 1st tertile 0.001 -0.009 0.002 -0.004
(0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012)
Wage 2nd tertile -0.009 -0.048** -0.003 -0.032*
(0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.013)
Wage 3rd tertile -0.034** -0.057** -0.031** -0.052**
(0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013)
Observations 221,139 221,139 221,139 221,139
Notes: Displaced group includes women aged 18 to 35 with at least one year of tenure in closing
firms at the closure date. Control group is a 5% random subsample of women aged 18 to 35 with
at least one year of tenure in firms that do not close within the next 2 years of the reference date.
The outcome variable births next 3 years measures the number of children born between 6 and
36 months after the reference date. Covariates include: number of children born in the last 3, 6,
and 9 years, age and its square, tenure, experience, indicator for apprenticeship, blue collar status,
earnings at the reference date, year and quarter dummies. For weighted regressions standard errors
are bootstrapped (500 replications). Symbols: ** significant at 1%;* significant at 5%.
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Table 5: Pure displacement versus unemployment effect on fertility
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Births Births Births Births Births Births
next 3 years next 6 years next 3 years next 6 years next 3 years next 6 years
All Women
Firm closure -0.015 -0.023 -0.016 -0.024 -0.014 -0.025
(0.010) (0.015) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.019)
Unemployment 0.046 0.005 0.023 0.005 0.019 0.011
(0.086) (0.128) (0.038) (0.056) (0.055) (0.082)
Observations 221,139
Women in White Collar Jobs
Firm closure -0.018 -0.036* -0.023 -0.042* -0.017 -0.038*
(0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.019) (0.013) (0.020)
Unemployment 0.011 0.051 0.022 0.046 0.002 0.040
(0.112) (0.169) (0.046) (0.069) (0.063) (0.096)
Observations 164,215
F-stat (19 d.o.f.) 161.81 94.46 38.29
Notes: Estimations from instrumental variable regressions, where the unemployment variable is instrumented by firm closure interacted
with 8 year, 3 season, 3 industry, and 5 region dummies. F-statistics at the bottom of the table refer to the joint significance of the
excluded instruments in the first stage regression for the sample of all women. Unemployment is measured by the percentage of time
unemployed in the first year after the reference date (Model 1), an indicator for being unemployed for at least one day in the first year
(Model 2), and an indicator for being employed less than 75% of the time in the first year (Model 3). Displaced group includes women
aged 18 to 35 with at least one year of tenure in closing firms at the closure date. Control group is a 5% random subsample of women aged
18 to 35 with at least one year of tenure in firms that do not close within the next 2 years of the reference date. The outcome variable
births next 3 years measures the number of children born between 6 and 36 months after the reference date. Covariates include: number of
children born in the last 3, 6, and 9 years, age and its square, tenure, experience, indicator for apprenticeship, blue collar status, earnings
at the reference date, year and quarter dummies. Symbols: ** significant at 1%;* significant at 5%.
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